

d) Intensification and reorganization of International

Communist Front organizations

Formally started at Moscow November 1957

meetings as a corollary to better coordination of

Communist Parties. Purpose is to broaden

Soviet "peace" campaign and to capture leadership

elites in Afro-Asian area. (Afro-Asian Solidarity

Movement aims at women, students, trade unionists,

writers, youth, economists, politicians).

At Moscow November 1957 meetings Soviets said

(sensitive source) they would become more active

themselves in peace campaign. Presumably 1958

and 1959 Soviet "Summitry" is part of this tactic.

Main effort in 1958: creating regional coordination

centers to increase efficiency of fronts in under-

developed countries, e.g., Middle East; Cairo

Secretariat of Afro-Asian Solidarity Council

(development delayed due to fluidity of political

situation); Latin America: Buenos Aires Coordinating

Committee, established to broaden "peace" activities in Latin America; Far East: Chinese Communist Party increasingly provided training and financial support for international front activities, particularly in labor and peace fields. E. g., in July 1958 sixty-five (65) selected front activists (both CP members and fellow travelers) returned to Japan from functional training in China. In Thailand a small group of Thai front activists returned from China about the same time. In 1957 about forty-one million yen (about \$120,000) known to have been transmitted from China to Japan for front activities. Actual figure probably higher. The Japan CP in 1957 is known to have received only about seven (7) million yen (\$19,600). Outlook: In some underdeveloped areas, international and national, e. g., Far East, front activity will continue to be more important than CP activity proper, as regards pressure for pro-Bloc orientation.

CP's in general will take stronger hand in directing and building up local fronts. In free Europe, where Communists on defensive, fronts less effective, World Peace Council, e.g., may be increasingly used to support fronts in underdeveloped areas.

International Meetings of International Front organizations (e.g., 7th World Youth Festival) still important as propaganda and indoctrination shows, but indications are Soviets will be satisfied with smaller but better motivated attendance.

Bulk of Soviet Bloc subsidies to international fronts appears to be deployed in order to

1) strengthen service function, e.g., scholarship programs for youth and students; educational and organizational travel outside and within the Bloc; recreational and medical facilities (TB sanatoriums, clinics, etc.); refugee and "rebel" aid (Algeria);

20

publications and propaganda materials, and

2) strengthen support given to non-Communist

"national liberation movements" (e.g., the

Cameroon Democratic Union, instigator of violence

in the French Cameroons received L. 12, 000 in late

1958 from China via the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council).

In Western Europe--fronts less effective--efficiency

cutbacks in the budgets of some International Front

organizations (WFTU, WPC) as well as in national

affiliates (Italian Peace Partisans) have been noted.

On the other hand, International Fronts are urging

affiliates to improve their fund raising techniques

and to increase their ^{mutual} assistance support (bilateral

support and exchanges) mainly to increase their

financial efficiency.

e) Support for outlawed CPs and a policy of driving

towards "legalization" of outlawed CPs is a prime

Bloc objective in the current period. The reason:

a recognition that established national bourgeois leaders

such as NASR in Egypt, SUKARNO in Indonesia, and

King Mohamed V in Morocco are moving toward

true neutrality in the international arena and are increasingly

concerned over the development of Communist influence

within their countries. If Communist parties can gain

legal status now, particularly (as in the cases of Iraq,

Venezuela, and Cuba) during the period before a new government

has stabilized its control over the country, security counter-

measures against them will be much more difficult for

these governments to initiate. In countries such as Greece,

the campaigns for legalization, even when unsuccessful,

have made it possible for the Party and its allies to condemn

local governments as fascistic, anti-democratic advocates

of police states.

The Soviet Subversive Offensive

The International Communist Movement

1. Soviet and, to certain extent, Chinese Communist Parties, maintain coordinated program for strengthening subversion potential of free-world Communist parties and international front organizations. Special emphasis is on Latin American CP's and underdeveloped areas because most CP's in free Europe on defensive.

2. Main reason for this program:

Soviet confidence in long-term strength, viability and appeal of Communist system and intent to increase internal pressures abroad, where feasible.

Examples:

a) See recent attack on Nehru by Soviet Ambassador to China, Yudin, in issue #4 of World Marxist Review, and increasing militancy of CP India. Soviet lecturers indicate reason behind pressure: Conservative wing of Congress Party bankrupt.

b) Pressure by Arab CP's for loosening of UAR ties (Syria-Egypt) and resistance to extension of UAR to include other Arab areas (Iraq).

c) Latin American CP's were instructed at secret meeting

Moscow November 1957 to encourage and exploit anti-

US attitudes, overtly and covertly. Have implemented

1957 directives faithfully. New instructions will be

given Latin American CP delegates at 21st Congress of

CPSU (January 1958).

3. Main burden of program for strengthening CP's is on Soviet

CP. CP Chinese, however, has become increasingly active in supporting

Latin American CP's. Program consists of:

a) training of current and future CP leaders in Soviet Union

and China. We have identified, through sensitive penetration

operations location, curricula, teachers of some of these

training schools in USSR and China. Training takes place

at Higher Party School of CPSU but secret training facilities

for training of nationality groups also exist. In China one

training facility operated by CP China IS ~~for~~ Department

for liaison with Latin America. Curricula mainly political-

ideological. Definite indication from 1955--~~secretly~~ ^{recently}

received--of intelligence tradecraft training given to

foreign students in one party school. One returnee from

Chinese CP training school reports instruction on

penetration of domestic security and intelligence organizations.

In 1957/1958 training season, more than twenty (20)

free world CP's sent trainees to USSR. In 1958 foreign

students reportedly outnumbered Soviet students at CPSU

Higher Party School. In summer 1958, five CP's from

Latin America sent trainees to China.

b) Improved (clandestine) machinery for control, support

and coordination of international Communist movement.

Machinery and procedure improved at meetings of

Communist leaders, Moscow, November 1957 (40th

anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution).

CPSU's Foreign Section (International Department) under

Boris PONOMAREV was already strengthened during 1957.

Section is executive arm of Soviet Presidium in monitoring foreign CP's. Geographic breakdown (area desks) and many functionaries identified by us. In general Section somewhat less dictatorial and more inclined to listen to advice of foreign CP leaders. Still short of first-rate personnel. Other machinery includes:

plenary meetings of free world CP leaders (e. g. at 21st CPSU Congress);

regional meetings of CP leaders (e. g. , secret sessions of Latin American CP's of northern and southern regions in 1958);

increased contact of CP leaders with Soviet

Embassies abroad (e. g. , Soviet Ambassadors

briefed CP leaders on Malenkov/Molotov purge (July 1957) prior to public announcement; similarly advised some CP leaders not to send delegates to 7th Yugoslav Party Congress; in many cases Soviet Embassies arrange for travel to training schools in USSR and China; new secret communication

facilities between CP's in neighboring areas and
Soviet Embassy in *Italy* country observed.)

Increased ideological indoctrination through
issuance of Cominform successor World Marxist
Review (Problems of Peace and Socialism), published
from Prague in 16 languages. Staff of World Marxist
Review (WMR) includes many area experts from
free world. WMR pretends not to give directives.

Note that PONOMAREV--head of Foreign Section--
writes directive articles in Soviet KOMMUNIST.

Other means of indoctrination include functional
CP *book* meetings of/propagandists, unionists and historians

on regional basis. (e. g., in October 1958 eleven
CP's represented at meetings in Gramsci Institute
of CP Italy.)

Increased travel of Soviet delegations to free world
areas for review and consultation. (e. g., in 1958 a
Soviet Party delegation went to Italy prior to
elections; another delegation reviewed the East

German CP; delegations went to Japan, Denmark, etc. Soviet propaganda specialists went ostensibly to Argentina for Frondizi's inauguration and from there to other countries. Fact that some Soviet delegates are also bona fide Soviet journalists often facilitates travel.)

c) Bloc Subsidization of Free World Communist Parties

Continues to be part of the over-all build-up program.

Reliable, sensitive information indicates that at a special conference of Latin American CP delegates scheduled for Moscow, January 1959, in conjunction with the 21st CPSU Congress, ~~Methods~~ of financing or otherwise supporting Communist Parties will be discussed.

To date, these CPs have been supported mainly through provision of funds for travel (training, etc.) and holding of Communist conferences. A recent investigation of the subsidization of CP Japan reveals that from the USSR alone about \$700,000 was known to have been received between

1951 and 1958. In 1958 CP Japan is known to have received only about \$21,000 from the USSR. Between 1951 and 1958, CP Japan received \$150,000 from China. In 1958, about \$38,000 are known to have been received from China, the bulk of which was handcarried secretly from China.